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Draft Recommendation
on the public perception of security and defence afier Cologne
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the war in Kosovo has helped to further increase European public awareness of
the difficulties ex?enenced bv Europe m trying to deal wittr its own securiw problems;
(it) Noting that several official declarations on the proposed reform of the European institutions
have been issued recentll', without any explanation being given of the logical sequence of events;
(iii) Convinced of the need to inform citizens in a simple but comprehensive fashion about the differ-
ent stages of European integration, in particular in the field of security and defence, so that any reforms
are supported by public opinion;
(w) Aware of the responsibility it bears for conveying, through its role of parliamentary scrutiny, the
wishes of the national electorates to the governments gathered together in the Council;
(") Convinced nevertheless that the Council, member governments and WEU Secretary-General
must assume their responsibilities in filll for explaining to public opinion WEU's unique purpose and
the problems wluch must be resolved in order to complete the building of a security and defence
dimension at a trme which is particularly propitious for making this project a realrty,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTNCIL
1. Appnse the Assembly of how it is informing public opinion about the difficulties encountered in
building a security and defence Europe and about WEU's specific role rn this area;
2. Explain, in particular, the different stages of the process of reflection that is under way on insti-
tutional reform so that the pubhc can understand what the plans announced for the end of the 1'ear 2000
entail;
3. Emphasise to the member governments the international democratic deficit in the rnstitutional
proposals, provide for the maintenance of a representative assembly and consrder possible additional
measures to overcome the lack of international democratic scrutiny,
4. Urge member govemrnents to give all the propil prionty to the dissemination of information on
available assets and the commitnents of WEU and each of its member countries to European security
and defence;
5. Encourage the Presidency and the Secretary-General to strengthen their relations wrth the press
and to continue publishing updated rnformation documents such as the one entitled WEU today, ensur-
ing that they are rvidely disseminated in all the languages of the member countries, and also following
up Recommendation 638 on ''WEU's communication policy" adopted by the Assembly on 2 December
t 998.
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Explanatory Memor an dum
(submitted by Mr McNamara, Rapporteur)
I. Public opinion of the different stages
of European integration
1. A broader sectron of the public than ever
before has recently been taking an mterest in is-
sues of European security and defence. Firstly,
the citizens of member states have become more
aware of the realrty of Europe as a common edi-
fice, following the rntroduction of the single cur-
rency. $'hich showed that governments can reach
agreement on Community issues when common
interests are at stake and u'here there is a politi-
cal resolve to find institutional solutions.
2. Secondly, there has been an acute public
a\^'areness of the manl' crises that Europe has
encountered rn the Balkans, so close in terms of
culture and ties to many European states. In this
case, however, it was diffrcult to generate the
necessary common political rvill and x'hen it did
finally emerge, member states shorved themselves
incapable of translatrng it into action on the
ground. Both in Bosnia and Kosovo, the United
States rvas the one to show resoh'e, givrng rise in
public opinion to the conviction that only when
there are major economic interests at stake is it
possible to muster the support needed to forge a
common policy, because such interests elude the
power of governments and probably operate
across national borders through the intemational
financral netrvorks. Opinion surveys camed out
dunng the crisis showed a loss of confidence in
governrnents, rvhich are unrvilling to tackle the
transnational defence challenges. An aggravatrng
factor rvas the recollection, still fresh in many
minds, of the economic sacrifices that had been
made to meet the conditions for joining the euro.
Indeed, election results in several countries show-
ed drvindling support for the parties rn power.
Re kin d li n g s upp ort for th e int e gr ati on pr o c e s s
3. There rvas therefore a need to find ways of
rekindhng the public's support for the process of
European integration w'hich, in the meantime.
had taken further steps forward rvith the Amster-
dam Treatl'and was reaffirmed at every summrt
or bilateral meetmg.
4. This rvas no easy task, for the Kosovo rvar
m partrcular had brought to the notice of all sec-
tions of public opinion the fact that Europe n'as
not suffrciently present in the securit-v and de-
fence field. Confronted q.rth television images of
a rvar being rvaged b1' a NATO in wfuch the US
was the leading power, the man ur the street
could not fail to be struck by the contrast be-
t$'een the declarations ofthe European heads of
state and those of the NATO military spokesman.
It was soon realised that NATO had won not
only the military battle in the field. but also the
u,ar in terms of information and rmages, impos-
ing itself as a key player on the world stage for
the third millennium. For the EU and WEU, by
contrast, which were strugghng to make an im-
pact on public opinion, the meetings held at the
end of Germany's EU Presidency provided an
opportunit-v that could not be missed.
II. The Cologne Summit: a source of
misguided interpretation in the media
5. The Cologne Summit on 3 and 4 June
1999, which brought together the heads of state
and government of the Fifteen, was arl opportu-
nltv to renew the public's confidence in the ef-
forts of European governments to aclueve inte-
gration. Held, as it was, at the herght of the mil-
itary action in Kosovo, the Summit tried to pre-
pare the public for a histonc decision in the field
of the common European securit-v and defence
policy'. The "European Council Declaration on
strengthening the common European policy on
secunty and defence" contains a number of state-
ments, the fi.rll implications of w'hich are only
really grasped by well-informed speciahsts. Gen-
erally presented as a very ambitious programme
for European integration, it masks a much more
complex reality. It is therefore not surprising that
the reactions of the media gave rise to a whole
host of dif[erent and sometimes misguided inter-
pretations.
6. ln its Cologne Declaration, the European
Council announced its determination 'that the
European Umon shall play its full role on the
intemational stage" and 'to give the European
Union the necessary means and capabrlities to
assume its responsibilities regarding a common
European policy on secuntl'and defence". But it
goes on rmmediatelv to specifr that "the Council
should have the abilrty to take decisions on the
full range of conflict-prcvention and cnsis-man-
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agement tasks defined in the Treaty on European
Union, the 'Petersberg tasks' ".
7 . Thus there are two dif[erent issues here
w'hich the public often confuses, particularly
havrng followed the developments in the Balkans,
q.here the terminology used to define the different
tlpes of humanitarian and military intervention
has gradually been modrfied. Although there is
not a total consensus, hardly an),one now ser-
iously believes that there is a real danger of
another war on the territory of the EU. It is much
easier to imagine the EU takrng action to settle
crises rn neighbouring areas, although the opin-
ion polls reveal some scepticism on that score.
The only idea wluch has been fi.rlly grasped by
the public at large, in fact, is that of Europe's
dependence on decisions by the United States.
The newspapers have made the most of this
issue, attracting their readers' attention with such
provocative headhnes as ''Europeans want more
Europe", "The elusive European defence", "A
common defence to do what?" or "Europe: a
continent of goodwill and last-ditch compro-
mises".
8. The common threads running through all
such articles are: putting an end to Europe's sub-
ordination to the United States, comparisons of
defence spending and Europe's unsatisfactory
performance in general. They demonstrate 
- 
fig-
ures at hand 
- 
that the EU member states spend a
not inconsiderable arnount on defence wrth litle
to show for it. They emphasise the need for a re-
form of the common institutions in order to adapt
them to new requirements, without prepanng the
public for the financial rmplications of the ambi-
tious plans announced rn Cologne.
9. hr tlus respect, WEU has always been
compared unfavourably with NATO, of which it
has been presented as a pale and ineffectual imi-
tation. Or else it has been presented as a com-
plementary structure which it would be better to
integrate in the European Union. None of these
plans met urth objections when they were an-
nounced, but it seems clear that governments will
have great diffrculty in putting them into prac-
tice.
(a) The choice of High Representalive
for the CFSP
10. Several seemingly disparate facts were
announced to the public in Cologne. The first
rvas the Frfteen's designation of NATO's former
Secretary-General Javier Solana as Fhgh Repre-
sentative for the CFSP (Common Foreign and
Securitv Policy). Their choice of a rvell-knoqn
and experienced personality was reassunng to the
publrc atlarge, wrthout upsetting Europe's inter-
nal situation or its transatlantic relations. Some
time later, the idea of combining the post of High
Representative for the CFSP rvith that of WEU
Secretary-General began to take shape, grven the
unanimous support for Mr Solana's apporntrnent.
Several statements of approval were reported in
the medra. It remains to be seen how this issue
will develop, since the institutional debate has
only just started. The idea has been rvarmlv wel-
comed, but the means of putting it into practice
have yet to be defined. The media once again are
expected to convey encouraging messages about
the future of the European Union and, indeed, the
public in Europe rs becoming accustomed to
hearing announcements concerning new appoint-
ments of leaders of European institutions wrthout
really being told how the decision-making
process is orgamsed. This is the weak point in
the process of European union, which, given its
complexity, needs to be explained more clearly to
the public at large.
(b) The shifi oway from
the objectives of Amsterdam
1 1. In Cologne, the Fifteen above all announ-
ced their resolve to gradually frame a common
defence policy, but not 
- 
and this is a nuance
u'hich has escaped public attention 
- 
to create a
common defence as foreseen by the Amsterdam
Treaty. Article 17 of that Treaty outlines a broa-
der policv "which might lead to a common def-
ence", the progressive framing of which "wrll be
supported, as Member States consider approp-
riate, by cooperation betu,een them in the field of
armaments". Paragraph 2 states that "questions
referred to in this Article shall include human-
rtanan and rescue tasks, peacekeeptng tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis maragement,
including peacemaking". And finally, paragraph
3 stipulates that "the Umon urll avail itself of the
WEU to elaborate and rmplement decisions and
actions of the Union which have defence implica-
tions". Clearly there are two complementary hy-
potheses here: a general one, concermng an inte-
grated common defence system, and a more
specific one, conceming Petersberg operauons. In
any event it is stipulated that Western European
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Union will "be an integral part of the develop-
ment of the Union providrng the Union with
access to an operational capabihlv notably in the
context of paragraph 2". Since the Amsterdam
Treaty covered all areas concerning the future of
the European Union, the media drd not draw the
public's attention specifically to the issue of se-
curity and defence, preferring to focus on aspects
with a more direct impact on peoples' daily lives,
such as emplol,rnent, social and economrc policy,
the environment, reciprocal rights etc. They did,
however, devote a lot of attention to the CFSP
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) which
was a new development of some general interest,
more easily accessible to the public at large. A
merger of WEU with the EU would be taking
things a lot further than envisaged in Cologne,
where any reference to a common defence was
dropped. Indeedthat issue is entirely absent from
the Cologne Declaration which refers solely to
conflict-prevention and crisis-management activ-
ities, and it is for such activities only that the
Fifteen pledge to provide the Union with the
necessary capabilities and instruments. These
fine distrnctions will not, of course, have escaped
the specialist. However, the important message
behind the Cologne Declaration is Europe's de-
sire to free itself of its dependence on the US and
to show its resolve to shoulder responsibility for
its own security, somethrng which citizens, log-
ically, can only support.
12. There was no question at all in Cologne of
creating a European army, and yet tlus is the idea
that has taken root in the public mind, and which
was strengthened by the similar messages coming
out of the Franco-German Summit in Toulouse
several days before. Here, however, the language
is less complex, since the decisions on joint mili-
tary programmes are much more tangible, in that
they refer to budgetary issues and to the more
rational use of financial resources. Tlus is prob-
ably one of the arguments to which taxpayers are
the most amenable, for while the institutional
aspects of the EU often only rnterest a small,
well-informed section of public opinion, everyone
is able to perceive a direct link between the taxes
they pay and how the money is spent. Moreover,
the public al large will be even more sensitive to
decisions affecting the development of national
defence industries, given their very practical im-
plications for jobs in member states.
13. The Cologne Declaration refers, on the
issue of a cooperation framework for giving the
European partners an mdependent mrlitary cap-
ability, to the need for sustained efforts to
strengthen the defence industnal and technologi-
cal base, by fostering a restructuring of Euro-
pean defence industries and a harmonisation of
mrlitary requirements and of armaments plannug
and procurement.
III. Cologne and the "Kosovo" effect
14. Seven years previously, the war in Bosnia
had already highlighted Europe's weaknesses. A
general awareness had emerged during the
bloody process of Yugoslavia's dissolution that
Europe, for all its ambition to become a greater
world economic porver, was totally absent from
the picture. The Kosovo conflict, following as it
did the collective achievement of the single cur-
rency, was a reminder that nothtng seemed to
have changed in this respect. Europe was still out
of the picture and subordinated to its American
ally during this conflict on European territory.
Opinion surveys carried out at the time revealed
the enormous uncertainty of Europeans as they
saw their national positions rveakened. A public
debate soon developed on the need for Europe to
play a role, particularly as everyone was follow-
ing the war on their television screens.
i5. This acted as a spur to decision-makrng in
Cologne, wrth the Fifteen skipprng some of the
intermedrate stages that would have been neces-
sary for achieving a common defence and setting
the end of2000 
- 
dunng the French EU Presidency
- 
as akey'date inthatprocess. The aim ofadopt-
ing a timetable was to make the project more
tangible for public opinion, as though setting a
deadhne was a way of guaranteeing that it would
come about. France's commitrnent to this under-
taking was another guarantee, given that it was a
dnving force at Saint Malo, together urth the
United KingdorrL and at Toulouse, wrth Germany.
16. Under the influence of the Kosovo war,
virrually the whole political spectrum rallied in
support ofa European s)'stem ofdefence and the
few dissentrng voices 
- 
mostly on the extreme
left and right 
- 
were sidelined by the media. One
can hardly claim that there was any real drscus-
sion rvith the ferv opponents who voiced their
opiniot paticularlv since there was a concem to
avoid embarrassing the centre-left govemments -
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rvhrch meant the majority of European govern-
ments in 1999 
- 
in the run-up erther to national
or European elections.
\7. The press fell in with the movement. and
stressed, rvith reference to similar situations rn
the past, hou'the EU and WEU had constantly
farled to assert themselves in the region and had
ahvay's been totally overshadowed by NATO.
18. Thus, once agaln. the citizens of Europe
rvere strengthened in their scepticism x'ith regard
to the functioning of the European tnstitutions,
ufuch thel'perceived as the result of decisions by
an rntellectual and political elite unable to assure
democratic transparency in bodres rvluch. at ex-
actl1'the same time, were being tainted by their
first media scandal followrng accusations of fraud
and com.rption.
IV. The announced demise of WEU ond
ils effect on public opinion
19. ln parallel to their growrng arvareness of
the lack of a common security and defence policy
in Europe, the media began to realise that there
was a system uluch could have been used to deal
rvrth the situation, but rvhich for reasons that had
never been explained in detail, had not worked.
Indeed, WEU's ruckname of "Sleeping Beauty"
and the accusation of '-congerutal lethargr," rvere
tlpical of the rather picturesque criticism accom-
panying an), presentation of the Organisation.
Since the Saint Malo Declaration. the public had
been led to acknorvledge the need for institutional
change according to a range of possibilitres rvhich
had never been properlv gone into. What was
important $'as to arurounce a fresh start on intro-
ducing reforms, the details of which remarned to
be clarified.
20. Those details have not been revealed to
this day. Quite ttre contrary, rvhen one tries to see
one's wav more clearly', one begins to realise that
the road ahead is a lot longer than it initially ap-
peared.
21 . Holever, a ne\\' step was taken in Col-
ogne; urdeed the EU General Affairs Council was
instructed to "prepare the conditions and the
measures necessary (...) including the defimtron
of the modalities for the inclusion of those func-
tions of the WEU u'hich rvill be necessary for the
EU to frrlfil its ne\\' responsrbilities rn the area of
the Petersberg tasks. In tlus regard our aim is to
take the necessary decisions by the end of the
y-ear 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organi-
sation rvould have completed its purpose". The
idea of setting a deadline was probabll, to pro-
vide the public rvith a precise point of reference
and to establish a programme to be followed in
the run-up to that date. In fact it is norv being
presented less as a deadhne than as a starting
point for the construction of a new system of se-
curity and defence on the basis of orgamsations
rvhich remain to be defined. The French Presi-
dency is obliged to present European citizens
with a project, not a result.
22. It is a plty that the Declaration, perhaps
because it tries too hard, ends rvith a death sen-
tence for WEU. That, surely, can only strengthen
the widespread opinion that this institution is no
longer up to the new tasks facrng Europe in the
tllrd millennium.
The resuh of the absence of a WEU
communication policy aimed al public opinion
23. ln spite of the declared efforts and im-
provements in the area of communication policy,
WEU remains largely unknorrn to the general
public. This is not true of the more specialised
circles u'hich are more directly concerned, in
other words, the other international organisa-
tions, the national parliaments. the defence and
foreign affairs ministries, specialised research in-
stitutes and umversities. rvhich already receive
sufEcient rnformation. The problem is with the
man in the street and with those who shape pub-
lic opinion and au'aken the public's interest
through the media, in other rvords, journalists,
rvho are key oprruon-formers.
24. The WEU Assembly has tackled this prob-
Iem by regularll drauing up communication
plans which most certainl.v have helped to publi-
cise its activrties among specialised circles. ln-
deed, all that is needed is to adapt to the increas-
rngly sophisticated technologies that are currently
available by using the rnformation channels
u'hich are already in place. However, the Organi-
sation at intergovernmental level has been unable
to muster the same enthusiasm, and apart from a
ferv ministenal meetings 
- 
rndistinguishable in
the public's mind from the various other Euro-
pean gatherings 
- 
it has not been able to make
enough of an impact to rvin a place in the media.
In fact, no specific event has been organised for
publiciq,purposes. with the possible exception of
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the offrcial celebrations and declarations that
marked the 50th anniversary of the Brussels
Treaty. And, if an),thlng, those events in fact
contnbuted to mrsinforming public opinion, since
it was notthe 1948 Brussels Treat_v rvhich insti-
tuted WEU and its Assembly, but rather the
modtfied Brussels Treaty of 1954, of whuch the
5fth anniversary will be in 2004.
25. What is certainly lacking in WEU's com-
murucation policy is a media image that is im-
mediately associated u'ith its name. The rmage
should of course be that of its Secretary-General,
as spokesman for and representative of the Or-
garusation as a whole. The imminent appointment
of a new Secretary-General w-ill be a last chance
to attract the interest of public opinion for the
onll' European organisation with competence for
common secunty and defence and this, at the end
of the day, *l1l be decisive for the successfrrl
creation of secunt_v and defence Europe.
V The needfor a comprehensive
public information policy
26. One could have imagined that the tone
adopted by the current Finnish EU Presidency
might somewhat temper the initial enthusiasm
and that a kind of Nordic pragmatism would take
the place of sensationalist announcements. In-
deed, leaving aside the issue of a common de-
fence 
- 
on which apparently no headway' rs being
made 
- 
Finland has on several occasions an-
nounced its resolve to make progress on the
creation of a European capabilit_v for Petersberg
operations. Emphasis is also being laid on the
future participation of non-WEU member coun-
tries, and there are assurances on all sides that
they will not be excluded from the nerv rnsti-
tutional framervork. WEU's acqus in this field
have been duly' acknowledged, although this does
nothrng to allay the serious concern felt b1'the
public in those countries, parlicularly those
rvhich are not members of NATO, about the
danger of being sidehned. The reader is referred
on this issue to Mr Mesca's valuable contnbu-
tion to this reporl in which he sets out his views.
27. One question must soon be brought to the
public's attention: how is parliamentary, scrutinv
of decisions in the field of the common securitl'
and defence policy to be exercised in the future,
given that it is not certain whether the European
Parliament will have the necessarv porvers, and
rvhat reforms will be required? Indeed, the pres-
ent structure of the European Parliament is inap-
propriate for the task of scrutimsing rntergovern-
mental decisions on security and defence: the
members of the EP are directly elected b1'
universal suffrage and exercise scrutiny over the
activities of the European Commission, but have
no powers vis-i-vis indmdual governments. In
the plans for institutional reform that are cur-
rently being prepared, due attention must be paid
to ensuring that there is continurty of democratic
scrutiny. This could be exercised b1, a parliamen-
tary body rvluch, while it may not have a con-
figuration identical to that of the WEU Assem-
bly, could nonetheless be based on it, and would
be composed of directly elected members of na-
tional parliaments and of the European Parlia-
ment, as well as observers from countries sharing
a common rnterest in the secunty and defence of
Europe. The task of informing the citizens of
Europe on such issues falls to the members of the
national parhaments and of the WEU Assembly.
Given the determination reflected in govemment
statements to move ahead fast, it is up to parlia-
ments to constantly reiterate this demand for ac-
countabilitl', which is one of the principles of de-
mocracy. It is their responsibilrtl'to rarse public
awareness of this sensitive lssue on r,''hrch there
is likely to be a broad consensus.
28. The Assembly of WEU is currently the
only European institution u'luch has competence
for security and defence and rvhich can exercise
democratic scrutiny through its members. uho
are also members of their national parliaments.
This dual mandate proudes a link betrveen the
electorates of the member countries, national
polic1'and decisions taken at international level.
This system offers advantages u,hich must be
rntegrated, in the appropnate form, in the future
institutional architecture, for an attempt to rap-
idly adapt the powers of the European Parliament
might destroy this link in the democratlc process.
This rvould be particularll' disastrous in the light
of the drvindling confidence shown by the poor
turnout for the European elections, a sign of
widespread scepticism u'ith regard to the useful-
ness of that rnstitution
29. All these issues need to be explained in
more depth to the public at large. although many
people, u'hen presented wrth the details, may well
fail to grasp them in full. The time has therefore
come to take the situation in hand and to create
the conditions for sound information to be sup-
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plied through the media, in order to avoid having
recourse at the end of 2000 to expedients which
are bound to be detnmental to the democratic
future of the conlmon secunty and defence insti-
tutions, which in the eyes of the public may al-
ways be seen as berng governed by a distant elite.
A11 this means that governments wrll be unable,
when the time comes, to rally the support they
need to adopt vigorous measures at European
summits, thereby. dooming EU programmes to
failure and malang rt imposstble, once agarn, for
the European Union to play its proper role on the
rnternational stage.
W. Conclusions
30. Events are monng fast and the initial
conclusions which one mrght have drawn have by
now become outdated. The Assembly of WEU
has set in motion a process of institutional re-
flection about which it would be usefrrl to inform
the outside world 
- 
first the parliaments and then
the public at large. The comrng year should pro-
vrde a ventable testing-ground for new ideas.
Each step must be clearly explarned by the me-
dia, so that the project put together by the end of
2000 can count on a certain degree of public
support. An information effort needs to be made
vis-ir-vis the national parliaments, which must be
supplied wrth progress reports. It would be use-
ful for that purpose to organise special Assembly
colloqures or sessions with members of the for-
eign affairs and defence committees of the na-
tional parliaments, given that the institutional
changes to be made within the European Union
will one day have to be ratified by each national
parliament.
31. A recommendation could be submitted to
the Council, inviting it to supply detailed infor-
mation at each new stage of the process, so that
the national parliamurts and the public receive
explanations going vvell beyond the formal dec-
larations issued at the close of summit meetings.
Preparatory discussions on the new European
secunt-v and defence architechrre should be or-
ganised with the national parliaments and the
European Parliament. There must also be a con-
stant flow of information towards the Assembly
of WEU, rvluch will continue to provide the
expertise which has always characterised its an-
alyses and proposals.
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APPENDIX
submitted by Mr Mesca, Romania, co-Rapporteur
on the development of public opinion in central European countries: the case of Romania
1. History
1. Abandoned for nearly half a century to the
communist ideology and practices, Romania
managed nonetheless to build for itself a specific
attrtude in the Warsaw Pact, to adopt an original
position among the other partners 
- 
most of them
entirely obedient to Soviet Union policy for long
periods of time.
2. For instance, Romania was the first com-
munist country to get rid of the Sonet Army
toops in 1958 and the first eastern European
counlry to formally recognise and establish diplo-
matic relations wrth West Germany. It main-
tarned diplomatic and economic relations with
Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and rela-
tions wrth the People's Republic of China when
this country's relations with the Souet Union had
worsened to the pornt of war. Romania not only
refused to take part in the Warsaw Pact invasion
of Czechoslovakia, but even firrnly criticised
Moscow's decision. During the whole cold war
period, the Romanian leaders endeavoured to
adopt a correct foreign policy and to convey a
significant message to the West. For a time
Romama was considered important because it
challenged the huge po\\'er of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Romania played a role in the Eglpt-
ian-Israeli negotiations 
- 
in the Carnp David
Agreement.
3. Romanian citizens of a certain age 
- 
the
category ranging from 40 to 70 years 
- 
feel a
cerLain apprehension about the dangers which
periodically theaten the security'of their country.
Nobody' felt secure about being a citizen of one
of the Soviet Union's allies. Nobody in Romarria
lked to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, all
Romanians were proud of the attention paid to
their country by the u'estern rvorld. The Presi-
dents of France, the Uruted States, and so on, as
well as Prime Ministers, rvere frequent visitors to
Bucharest or received their Romaman counter-
parts in the most important capitals of the west-
ern democracies.
4. Romania's situation and its image in the
West changed dramatically soon after 1985, fol-
lowing the comrng to power of Mikhail Gor-
bachev as the undisputed leader of the Soviet
Union. Even the most secret and optimistic
dreams of western leaders carne true, thanks to
this individual who had emerged from the very
core of the communist system. He was in favour
of a process he called "perestroika" and of an
unvamished manner of presenting realities he
called "glasnost".
5. Of course, rrterest in Romania dropped
dramatically, and all the rnternal policy mistakes
Nicolae Ceausescu had made became reasons for
harsh accusations. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev
managed to disrupt the system as a whole, not
only a part of it. Romania was supposed to fol-
low the trend.
6. Romamans saw the positive side of the
1989 events, namely, access to democracy, the
hope of achieving reunification with Bessarabia
and Northern Bukovina, the possibility of drs-
tancing themselves from the Soviet Union and, to
put it in a nutshell, of acquiring lasting security.
Romanians noted that justice had been done vis-
i-vis the Baltic states, wfuch had recovered their
independence (lost as a consequence of the Molo-
tov-Ribbentropp Pact) and welcomed the reuni-
fication of Germany. in the secret hope that in the
newly established pattern of relations, due con-
sideration would also be given to Romania.
7. Now, ten years after the events of 1989,
Romanians hope that a real and frrnctional de-
mocracy will bnng them, through a normal pro-
cess, some degree of welfare, real independence
and real secunq'. Frustrated many times in its
history, Romania is persuaded that its future lies
within the Euro-Atlantic structures and that its
security will be guaranteed either within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or a corre-
spondrng European structure.
8. Before the Madrid Summit, 85% of the
Romanian population thought this was the right
path for Romania to follow. Romanians were
impressed and particularly convinced by the de-
fensive character of NATO, the efficiency of its
technologv, its discipline, its deterrent capabihq'
and, last but not least, the solidarity among its
members.
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2. Romania 
- 
vhat kind of security?
9. An analy'sis of the particular case of Ro-
mania has revealed to us what Romanians think
about secunt\', horv they describe therr situailon,
u,hat therr expectations are, and how they rntend
to meet the challenges of the moment.
10. It is a fact that Romanian foreign policl'
has ahvays been devoted to reducing sources of
conflict and actrng as a mediator. All the Roma-
nian leaders, at least during the past half century
have been unequivocal about their commitment
to peace. Romaman diplomacy play'ed an impor-
tant role in the Helsmk process and in all the
processes dedicated to secunty and peace. ln or-
der to get closer to its objectives of joining Euro-
pean and Euro-Atlantic organisations, Romania
entered mto formal compromises, signing tw'o
treatles urth Hungary and Ukrarne. Romanian
citizens used to perceive security essentially as a
matter of territory and military forces, and until
recentll', thanks to the relative wealth of their
lands, thel'paid less attention to economic, social
or environmental sources of insecurity.
11. Nou-ada1's Romarua is a full member of
the Councrl of Europe, an associate partner of
Western European Union, and has applied for
membership of NATO and the EU. Accession to
these orgamsations has become a national prior-
iq, and enjol's the full support of all the political
parties in the Romanian Parliament. Romania
has been involved to varying degrees in most of
the United Nations humanitanan activities, such
as the police or peacekeeping operations in So-
malia, Angola, Albama, etc.l.
12. Romania has made every effort to adapt its
armed forces to NATO requirements. A complex
diplomatic programme \\as put into practice
before the Madrid Summit in order to argue the
case for NATO membership, because it rvas con-
sidered the one and only guarantee ofsecunty.
13. This accounts for the 85% share of Ro-
manians x'ho were in favour ofjoining NATO.
--' 
Th" *ta"al programme for Romania's accession
to the European Union.
3. The Kosovo war and the change in
the public perception of NATO
14. After the Kosovo cnsis broke out and
throughout the subsequent developments, the
Romaman authonties 
- 
the President, the Gov-
ernment as a rvhole and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 
- 
approved of NATO's action. The vierv
taken at official lel'el from the very first moments
of the bombrng was that this action was entirely
justified. The majonty of the Romanian media,
hou'ever, took the opposite stance.
15. ln vierv of the good relations that had ex-
isted for centuries between Serbia and Romania
and the fact that NATO had ignored the United
Nations' advice and acted without its approval,
takrng into account also the exaggerated reac-
tions of certain great powers and of their leaders,
the huge losses (both human and matenal), arrd
finalll,the unquestionable fact that the Yugoslav
Government had been freel1, and democratically
elected, the public perception of NATO rapidly
detenorated rn Romarua.
16. Popularity raturgs dropped dramatrcally,
and by the end of the Kosovo war, only 45o/o of
the population still considered it beneficial and
morally acceptable for Romama to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Orgarusation.
1,7. Romanians closely followed the evolution
of the cnsis and of the w'ar and were disapprov-
ing, in particular of the lack of explicit UN
endorsement of the strikes. At the same time,
NATO's refusal to take account of the Pope's
traditional "Urbi et Orbi" address at Easter time
and its rejection of any armistice during erther the
Catholic or Orthodox Easters had an adverse im-
pact on Romanian public opinion. The massive
losses, both in human lives and in material terms,
and the cool auitude of lugh-rankrng NATO
mrlitary officials towards so-called "collateral
losses" increased sl.rnpathv for the "targets"2.
18. The Romanians' attitude was by no means
surprising, given that even in the United States.
President Clinton's populanty rating dropped
ftom 63Yoto 57%o over the same matter.
tffr. V"gotlav crisis. Offrcial statements. Analysis.
Romanian Parliament 
- 
Department for information.
studies and research.
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19. Experts rn intemational law expressed
wide-ranging oprnions about the justification or
lack of justification for NATO's atfacks. Some
of the most severe criticism, in a way saving
Europe's honour, came from France, where 46%o
of citizens were against the bombings and only
40o/o in favour. and from the United Kingdom.
where the media pointed to the metamorphosis of
Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Robin Cook from
the young pacifists ofthe 1960s and 1970s to the
u'ar hawks of 1999. A very interesting position
was expressed by two of the best qualified
generals 
- 
Jean Cot from France and Sir Michael
Rose from the UK 
- 
both former commanders of
LNPROFOR in Bosnia. The former underlined
the "incredible inhibitions of the Europeans rvho
think they are not able to do anyttung uithout
Amencan help" and the latter 'the lack of clarity
of the legal background of NATO's intervention
in Kosovo".
20. In Germany there was a great vanetl' of
opinion, rangrng from uncondrtional support to
the cnticism expressed by Erich Schmrdt-Een-
boom, an expert in the secret services, who said
in an interview with the Mrttel Detrtsches Rund-
funk that "Germany has great responsibility for
the escalation of the violence in Kosovo because
the previous governrnent in Bonn, led by Helmut
Kohl, rndirectly provided the UCK's weapons".
21. The Italian Prime Minister, Massrmo
d'Alema, had to prove his country's dedication to
NATO, in spite of his own political background.
The results of a poll showed that 45.6%o of Ital-
ians opposed NATO's attack on Yugoslavia and
that only 37 .7% were in favour. Greece had the
most radical opposition to NATO's intervention,
expressed both by the Pnme Mimster, Costas
Simitis, and the Defence Minister, Akis Tsohat-
sopoulos. The famous ''Elefterogpia" even ac-
cused the "Pax Americana (that) steps over the
intemational law".
22. Because of its morai aspects, it is certainly
worth mentiomng the position of the Vatican,
which called for an immedrate stop to the bomb-
ing and the "LIN's rapid intervention".
23 Austna, considering that NATO's action
created a dangerous precedent for military alli-
ances, expressed another interesting position. A
poll showed that 72%o of Austrians were against
jorning NATO.
4. Romanian fficial and public perception of
European security ond defence after Cologne 
-
interests and perceptions of
central European states
24. It would seem that there is a certain differ-
ence behveen the official and the public percep-
tion of security and defence in Romania Even
though successive goverrunents have ranked ad-
mrssion to NATO as the most important strategic
goal from the security point of view, the public,
for the reasons described above, has become
more and more critical tou'ards the North Atlan-
tic Treat-v Organisation. (As a matter of fact, the
feehng is not characteristic of Romama only. For
common citizens, the positions and responsibili-
ties of the European and Euro-Atlantic organis-
ations and their structures and links with each
other are quite difficult to understand.) Romania
needs to maintain its commrtnent and dedication
to a powerful and efficient organisation hke
NATO. At the same time there is a general
feeling that NATO went much too far in trying to
solve all the European problems of defence 
-
sometimes overreactrng. For a long time, most
Romamans were confident, more than they had
been during the "balance of terror" between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the power of the
United Nations and of international law. Nowa-
days they cannot possibly disregard the position
of the fN or simply overlook the principles
enshrined in it of sovereignty, independence and
non-interference in countries' internal affairs.
25. It became clear to us, dunng our study,
that Romanians would prefer to have a European
defence structue with everything that this en-
tails. Romanians believe that such a European
structure would have a different auitude with re-
gard to the population and infrastructure. There
is a general feeling that the US is too big a
country faced with global problems, and too far
away to pay sufficient attention to a very' small
part of Europe. Otherwise 
- 
for instance 
- 
navi-
gation rvould not still be blocked on the Danube
as a consequence of bombing the Yugoslav
bndges, to say notlung of the pollution problems
in the countries through which the river passes.
26 Romanians would like to rely on a Euro-
pean defence structure, connected wilh or inte-
grated in the EU, an organisation composed of
countries that constantly and efficientll, deal wrth
issues related to ethnic and religious minorities,
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because even w'hen European standards on the
nghts of ethnic and religious minorities are ob-
served. the possibilrty still remarns that current or
old misunderstandrngs. frustrations and resent-
ment will emerge once again and de'r'elop into
situations of tension.
27. In fact, rt is none too earlv to implement
the European Secunt-v and Defence Identitl.,
taking into account the current and prospective
situatron on the continent. The Amsterdam
TreaW, which refers to the need to ensure the
securitv of EU's external borders (Art J l) and to
be able to take operational action uhcre neces-
san' (Art.J.4) provides a basis on w'hich to deal
r,vith the delicate problem of American leadership
and transatlantic relations.
28. As Tonl' Blair explained rvhen presenting
the UK's new position in a speech in Edinburgh
on 13 November 1998. "Europe needs to develop
the ability to act alone rn circumstances where,
for ufiatever reason, the US is not able or does
not wish to participate. Wh1' should US taxpay'-
ers and US troops always have to resolve prob-
lems on our doorstep?"3.
29. Romania agrees rvith this point of vieu',
and this is vahd for both the official and public
levels, although the reasons in each case ma1, be
different.
30. WEU Assembly Document 1638, "Time
for Defence" is enlightening rn this respect:
"At present, on1), WEU provides both the
Europear members of NATO rvho are not
members of EU and the central European
countries nith a real possibilit_v of partici-
pating in the framing of a European secu-
ritl'policl'and benefiting from the advan-
tages offered by a European securitl' area.
This is uhy it is essential that rvhen
WEU's powers are transferred to the
European Union, the WEU associate mem-
ber and parhers countries must be given a
guarantee that they urll continue to
t "WEU and European defence: beyond
Amsterdam": Assembly Document 1636
enjol' all the rights of participation they
currentll' have in WEU".
31. We firmly' believe that this position grant-
ed to and requrred by associate member and
partner countries is not a matter of prestige or
pnde 
- 
it is a matter of mutual confidence and
securitl,. It rvill give these countries the feeling of
having a saf in a Europe u'here the decision-
making process can hardly overlook their view-
pornts and interests.
5. Communication, information and
education 
- 
the need to involve and take
account of public opinion in order to build a
new security and defence system in Europe
32. Thanks to a very large number of news-
papers, television and radio stations and a good
ratio of foreign ianguage speakers. the Romanian
population is generally well-informed about dom-
estic and foreign affarrs. Many'Romamars read
or listen to both Romanian and foreign media.
Like everpvhere else in Europe, in large areas
near borders, people can follorv the telev'ision and
radro broadcasts of neighbouring countries. In-
deed, people can form objective points ofvierv on
both domestic and external issues. The Govern-
ment has publicised the National Programme for
Romania's Accession to the European Union and
all the steps taken for the country's integration in
NATO. A1l the officral contacts, all the decisions
rn the field of defence, the shorr- and medium-
term prionties, institutional reform and financ-
rng. are rvell-publicised aspects of the Govern-
ment's activities. The tradrtional pro-u,estern
feelings of the Romanians will make the process
oftakrng an active part in the nerv European se-
curity and defence policy a normal and n'ell-
accepted step. Romania ex?ects its voice to be
heard and listened to whenever European securitv
and defence matters are dealt wrth. since a Euro-
pean securitl' and defence policv u'ithout the
central and eastern European countrres' involve-
ment seems inconceivable. Romania is ready and
*'illing to take its place in that process.
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